Th e purpose of this article is to show the role played by the party leadership in the Progress Party and the Danish People's Party in the formation and consolidation of party organization, policy and strategy. Th e added knowledge provided by this article is an elaboration on one of the successful so-called radical right political parties of this century, namely the Danish People's Party, and its predecessor, the Progress Party, for the non-Danish speaking audience. Based on a plethora of data sources (interviews, documents, surveys and secondary material), the analysis shows that the diff erences in how the Progress Party and the Danish People's Party are organized are much larger than any organizational modifi cations aft er the party leader change from Kjaersgaard to Th ulesen Dahl. While Kjaersgaard was not able to implement marked organizational changes within the Progress Party, she did stand for a diff erent strategy and policy than Glistrup, focusing on parliamentary infl uence, and a right-wing position on the new politics dimension, but more pro welfare on the redistributive dimension. Th ere were no substantial changes in organization, strategy or policy when Th ulesen Dahl took over the leadership of the Danish People's Party; however, the strategy prior to the 2019 election did change. In sum, the overall expectation that party organisational change was larger when Kjaersgaard took over from Glistrup in the Progress Party, and in particular when establishing the new Danish People's Party, than when Th ulesen Dahl took over from Kjaersgaard, is mainly supported.
Introduction
Party leaders are central when new parties are established, in particular in the type of personal(istic) parties, characterized by the dominance and centrality of the party leader in regard to party formation, party organization and party survival, of which we see an increasing number of (Gunther & Diamond 2003; Calise 2015; Kostadinova & Levitt 2014; Keff ord & McDonnell 2018) . On the Danish right wing, the party leader has indeed been central in the formation of fi rst, Mogens Glistrup's Progress Party, and more than twenty years later also Pia Kjaersgaard's Danish People's Party. Th e Progress Party entered the Folketinget, the Danish parliament, with 28 seats out of 179 in 1973. It was a game changer not only by adding another actor to the established party system but also due to its protesting and anti-establishment nature (Kosiara-Pedersen & Kurrild-Klitgaard 2018) . Kjaersgaard and her followers split from the Progress Party in 1995 to form the Danish People's Party, which is a de facto continuation since the Progress Party aft erwards went into decline (Pedersen & Ringsmose 2005) .
Th e purpose of this article is to show the role played by the party leadership in the Progress Party and the Danish People's Party in the formation and consolidation of party organization, policy and strategy (cf. Harmel & Janda 1994) . Th e added knowledge provided by this article is an elaboration on one of the successful so-called radical right political parties of this century, namely the Danish People's Party, and its predecessor, the Progress Party, for the non-Danish speaking audience. As in other successful right-wing parties in particular, and new parties in general, the party leadership plays an important role. Th is article aims to examine how the three main party leaders of these two parties have had an impact on the party organization, policy and strategy.
Th e article fi rst presents the theoretical basis and methodology of the paper. Th e analysis is divided into three sections based on the party leaderships of Mogens Glistrup, Pia Kjaersgaard and Kristian Th ulesen Dahl: 1. Th e formation, rise and fall of the Progress Party, 2. Th e formation and fi rst fi ft een years of the Danish People's Party, and 3. Th e seven years under the leadership Th ulesen Dahl. Each section shows the role played by these party leaders in the formation and consolidation of the party organizations, policies and strategies, and hence, how party leadership (change) has an impact on party policy, strategy or organization (cf. Harmel & Janda 1994) .
Th eoretical framework
Th eories of party change and party organization form the theoretical framework within which the role of the Progress Party and the Danish People's Party leadership in the formation and consolidation of party organizations, policies and strategies is analyzed. Th e purpose of this article is not theory testing but the theory guides the narrative.
Much emphasis within party research has been put on the party decline. However, in particular from the 1990s, the 'decline' and 'failings' in book titles within party research were replaced with 'change' and 'adaptation'. Harmel and Janda's (1994) integrated theory of party change and party goals, bridging these two literatures, has been particularly seminal and useful. In Harmel and Janda's framework, the main independent variables explaining party change is leadership change, change in the dominant faction, and external stimuli, in particular those related to the party's primary goal termed 'external shocks ' (1994: 266-8) . Th e main focus within this article is on the change of the party leader, and whether this is related to party change. Party change is a change in a party's "rules, structures, policies, strategies and tactics"; aspects of change that are in direct control of the party (Harmel and Janda 1994: 275) . In this article, I focus on changes in organization (rules and structures), but also include changes in strategies and policies. Organization is here understood as the formal party organization based on party statutes as well as how it works in practice. How parties organize has been of interest to the political science 7 (1)/2019 community for more than hundred years (Ostrogorski 1903; Michels 1911) . However, it really took off with the Mair led project in the 1990s (1992; 1994; 1995; 2018) , and a renewed focus continues currently with the wealth of data publicly available through the Political Party Data Base project (Scarrow et al. 2017; www.politicalpartydb.org) . When analyzing party organizations, emphasis was initially on the 'original' party types of elite parties, mass parties, catch-all/electoral-professional and cartel parties, as identifi ed in what became classics due to their theoretical refl ections on how parties organize (Duverger 1954; Kirchheimer 1966; Panebianco 1988; Katz & Mair 1995) . In particular when Katz and Mair (1995) summed up the party organization research (and presented the cartel party model), they emphasized party adaptation and change rather than general decline.
Th e party organization literature focuses on various dimensions of organization, either implicitly or explicitly in tables (e.g. Katz and Mair 1995) . Th e organizational characteristics focused upon here are the most important ones, namely the rules and structures in regard to candidate nomination, party leader selection, representation at the annual meeting, party member exclusion and party discipline, as well as the de facto practices. Th e strategies focused upon here are those pursued in regard to formal government formation (including providing the parliamentary majority of a minority government) and parliamentary collaboration. Th e policies focused upon are both the party's political program and the issues de facto emphasized.
Th e three party leaders focused upon here, Glistrup, Kjaersgaard and Th ulesen Dahl, each have diff erent leader personalities; however, only the Glistrup-Kjaersgaard change led to a change in the base of power as it altered the dominant coalition, unlike to the Kjaersgaard-Th ulesen Dahl transition (cf. Harmel and Janda 1994: 280) . Th e dominant faction was replaced when the Danish People's Party was established, and this maximized the conditions for party change, since the leadership in this situation was expected to "engage in both power-motivated and goal-motivated changes" (Harmel and Janda 1994: 282) . Hence, party change was expected to be larger when Kjaersgaard took over from Glistrup in the Progress Party, and in particular when establishing the new Danish People's Party, than when Th ulesen Dahl took over from Kjaersgaard.
Method, cases and data
Th e modest ambition of this article is to show the impact of the party leaderships of one of the successful so-called radical right political parties of this century, namely the Danish People's Party, and its predecessor the Progress Party, in order to contribute with nuance to the argument about the importance of party leaders in new (populist, right-wing) parties. Hence, focus here is not mainly on the electoral importance, but also of how party leaders choose to organize and the strategies and policies, they pursue.
Th is is, to some extent, a comparative analysis of the impact of the three party chairs of the Progress Party and the Danish People's Party. Th ese are not two distinct parties, since the Danish People's Party is the successful portion of the Progress Party aft er the split in 1995. On the other hand, the split in 1995 provided a window of opportunity for major changes that established parties do not have. Th ese two parties provide good examples of how party leaders may play a major role in the formative phase but also that party owners may be replaced.
Th e Progress Party is one of "the most important right-wing populist parties that emerged" in the second wave (Mudde 2019: 15) . Th e Danish People's Party is one of the 15 main populist radical right parties in Europe; parties which have nativism, authoritarianism and populism in common (Mudde 2017; Mudde 2004) . Nativism, i.e., the combination of nationalism and xenophobia, shows clearly in their party principles and manifesto, where Denmark is supposed to be for Danes only since non-Danes threaten the homogeneous nation-state (Danish People's Party 2019b; Danish People's Party 2019c). Authoritarianism defi ned as the importance of authoritative fi gures and emphasis on law and order, is also clear. Th e Danish People's Party emphasizes law and order across the policy areas and promotes a high level of punishment for crimes involving the safety of both humans and animals (Danish People's Party 2019b; Danish People's Party 2019c).
'Populism' is a more disputed concept but the core could be argued to be rhetoric where the pure people are positioned against the (corrupt) elite, that is, an anti-elite sentiment. Th e Danish People's Party is not an extreme right party, as they do not contest democracy (cf. Mudde 2004) , and neither was the Progress Party. However, they do apply some populist rhetoric. Th e Progress Party wanted to undermine the legitimacy of the gammelpartier (old parties) and the welfare state system (Bille 1989) . Due to the parliamentary role of the Danish People's Party, they are markedly less anti-mainstream or anti-elite than the Progress Party. Th eir engagement with everyday politics integrates them into the established political system. Danish People's Party members and voters have lower levels of both external and internal effi cacy as well as social trust when compared to those of other parties, which underpins an anti-elite perspective on politics (Kosiara-Pedersen 2017: 276-280) . Th e rhetoric of the Danish People's Party is no doubt populist. As stated by Kjaersgaard in her autobiography: "We need to be the people's party, and there needs to be room for the common man and those people others dislike" (Albertsen 2014; author's translation) . Th e Danish People's Party is not for those "who take a short trip to London to shop. Th ose with extended education, high incomes and expensive cars. Th ose who live far away from the problems" (Albertsen 2014; author's translation) .
Th e narrative of this article is based on a multitude of data sources. Th e analysis of the Danish People's Party is mainly based on 1. Party statutes of the Danish People's Party from 1996 with changes in 2003 and 2006 (Danish People's Party 2019a), 2. Party leaders' offi cial CVs from parliament's website (Folketinget 2018; , 3. Interviews with the leader of the Danish People's Party Kjaersgaard (Kjaersgaard 2002) , the leader of the party secretariat in the Danish People's Party, Steen Th omsen (Th omsen 2002), and the party secretary in Danish People's Party, Poul Lindholm Nielsen (Nielsen 2017 ); 4. Th e Danish People's Party manifesto (Danish People's Party 2019b , 2019c . Th e analysis of the Progress Party is mainly based on secondary material, primarily the analysis and data on the formation and organization of the Progress Party provided by Lars Bille (1997) . In addition to these sources, the analysis also includes opinion polls (Danmarks Radio 2019) and newspaper articles.
Th e creation and life of the Progress Party
Mogens Glistrup was a tax attorney proud of not paying taxes. He became a public fi gure when he in the beginning of 1971 participated in a television program on taxation and fi rst likened tax cheats with the railway saboteurs of Second World War's resistance movement, and then showed his 'zero-tax-form' (Larsen 1977) . Hence, he appeared on television but was not a TV personality as such. Half a year later, a local party branch of the Conservative People's Party nominated him to be a candidate for parliamentary election, but he was declined access to the nomination meeting since he was not a party member (Bille 1997) . Glistrup had been politically active in the 1960s promoting a drastic reduction of the public sector and the elimination of personal tax. As a response to the Conservatives refusing his nomination, Glistrup announced that he established his own party, the Progress Party.
When Glistrup announced the establishment of the Progress Party in the Grøft en restaurant in the Tivoli amusement park on a sunny day in August 1972, he had fi ve concerns with regard to creating a new party: 1. to gain the necessary 17,000 signatures to become eligible to stand for election as a party; 2. the lack of staff and personalities; 3. the 2% electoral threshold; 4. collaboration within the parliamentary group; and 5. lack of funding. Th ese were concerns "since he did not want to create a party" (Bille 1997; author's translation) . Glistrup was aware of the barriers to entry and the need for resources, and also that a mainstream party organization would be one way which could grant him these; however, while this was not a path he wanted to tread, that is what he, to a large extent, ended up with.
Th e Progress Party was an anti-party system party. As argued by Lars Bille (1989) , the Progress Party was not anti-system in Sartori's term (1976) but opposed the established party system. At the beginning of the 1970s, the Danish parties were mass parties characterized by a branch structure, party members with rights and duties in regard to candidate nomination, leadership selection and manifesto making, and though declining: class-party linkage and party membership fi gures. Th ere was no public party fi nancing and professionalization in regard to party staff and political marketing. Glistrup opposed building a traditional party organization. He did not want the Progress Party to look like the other 'old parties', in particular, since statutes, procedures, division of labour etc. would imply exactly the kind of bureaucracy that Glistrup fought politically to limit (Bille 1997: 62) . At the fi rst annual meeting in 1973, prior to the election, Glistrup de facto decided who could attend. Th e decision at the meeting was that local branches could be organized but that no national organization would be formed. No rules and procedures for the following candidate nominations were decided, so these became rather random. Some candidates were picked by Glistrup himself, other candidates by local branches, and some of the latter were vetoed by Glistrup. Th is chaotic process showed the need for some formality, and while Glistrup managed to postpone the decision for some years, by 1976 the Progress Party had a party structure not dissimilar to the established parties (Bille 1997: 62-63; Larsen 1977) .
Glistrup opposed the formalization of the organization and managed to sustain some control via a powerful national committee (Bille 1997: 63) . Glistrup was himself a lifelong member of the exclusive national committee which had fi ve other members elected by the annual meeting. Th e national committee could appoint attendants to the annual meeting. As argued by Lars Bille: It was with "the strong central leadership and one person's both formal and de facto dominating position that this new party distinguished itself from other Danish parties. Not in its basic structure" (1997: 63; author's translation). Hence, if Glistrup had been able to get it his way, the Progress Party would to a much larger extent have supported Harmel and Janda's argument, that "new organizations are quicker to experiment with new organizational forms" (1994: 282). Glistrup did not want the mass party structure which the Progress Party to a large extent ended up with but preferred a personal party.
Candidate nomination lay in the hands of the local branches, but their procedures were to be approved by the national committee. In 1992, it was formalized that the powerful national committee were to approve the candidates; hence, a limitation of rank-and-fi le party members' say in the intra-party democracy (Bille 1997: 118) . More central control than in classic mass parties, and more than in the established Danish parties.
Th e lack of organizational transparency and party leadership formed the basis for internal turmoil and division in the coming decades (Bille 1997: 62) . Party voters seemed to dislike this. Aft er the initial very successful election in 1973, where the Progress Party gained almost 16 percent of the votes (see fi gure 1 below), the electoral support of the Progress Party declined steadily until 1984 except for a small increase from 1975 to 1977.
Glistrup had given himself the title of 'campaign leader', which left the Progress Party as the only Danish party where neither the chair of the membership organization, chair of the parliamentary group or political spokesperson was the party leader (Bille 1997: 106) . While there is no doubt that Glistrup was the party owner and leader right from the beginning, his absence due to his jail sentence for tax evasion in 1983 left a leadership vacuum (Bille 1997: 106) .
Political and strategic disputes
Kjaersgaard took over the leadership of the Progress party in 1984 when Glistrup was imprisoned for tax fraud. According to herself, she became political spokesperson in 1984 without the prior consent of the parliamentary group merely by stating it to one of the tabloid newspapers (Kjaersgaard 2013) . She was the political spokesperson from 1984 to 1993. However, until 1989, she shared the de facto party leadership with Helge Dohrmann, who chaired the parliamentary group (Bille 1997: 386) .
Kjaersgaard stood for election in 1979 and 1981 before getting elected in 1984 (Folketinget 2018) . Hence, her political, parliamentary experience was limited when taking on the de facto party leadership of the Progress Party. Prior to her entry to parliament, from 1978 to 1984 Kjaersgaard cared for the elderly as a 'home carer', and this is a CV that she has used politically to indicate her base among ordinary, common people (even though she is the daughter of a shop owner and hence not with a classic worker background).
Aft er Glistrup was reelected to parliament in 1987, an internal tension between a hardliner, protest line, represented by Glistrup and the pragmatic line pursued by Kjaersgaard developed. Th e division on policy and strategy resulted in a power struggle. While the party agenda from the outset had focused on economic liberalism, less tax, smaller public sector etc., the party program was in the 1980s supplemented with anti-immigrant messages. Glistrup made some harsh statements about Muslims and immigrants, and in 1991 he was excluded from the party he had himself formed. However, Glistrup's exit did not end the fragmentation, which continued until the Progress Party split in 1995.
Th e Progress Party reached a low point of electoral support at the 1984 election, where Kjaersgaard was elected for the fi rst time and took on a role in the leadership. At the two following elections in 1987 and 1988, the Progress Party saw some increases; however, nowhere near their 1973 success. From 1988, the trend was downward again. Hence, during the combined leadership of Helge Dohrmann and Kjaersgaard 1984 -1988 (Bille 1997 , the Progress Party increased their electoral support, whereas it was declining under the (sole) leadership of Kjaersgaard from 1988 . Th e political strategy of Kjaersgaard seemed less popular among the (potential) Progress Party electorate.
Th e confl ict at the leadership level between Glistrup's protest line and Kjaersgaard's pragmatic line came out at full speed at the annual meeting of the Progress Party in 1995. 1 At this chaotic annual meeting of the Progress Party, Kjaersgaard and her fraction lost the leadership contest. In short, Kjaersgaard tried to extend her leadership to encompass leadership of the membership organization. Previously, these positions had been separate (Bille 1997) . Hence, Kjaersgaard was unsuccessful in centralizing leadership within the Progress Party. Th e most chaotic part may be viewed (in Danish) here: https://www.youtube.com/ watch?v=wCuAlBoUiqs (Th e Progress Party 2019). Hence, it is reasonable to argue that the Danish People's Party is the de facto successful succession of the Progress Party.
In sum, Glistrup represented a desire for organizational innovation but was limited in the extent to which he could implement this by his supporters as well as the established institutions within the parliamentary democracy. Parliamentary routines and the praxis of the political system led to a more established organization than that which Glistrup initially wanted. Also on the political front, he brought renewal. Th e right-wing stance on the size of the economic sector and taxation was beyond what the system normally heard of, and in the 1980s he pioneered anti-immigration and anti-Muslim views. Glistrup stood for a harsh, right wing, oppositional line, which only makes sense for parties on the fringes of the political system to pursue, while Kjaersgaard wanted to pursue a more pragmatic, cooperative strategy. While the latter was not welcome within the Progress Party, it turned out to be rather successful with the Danish People's Party.
Th e creation and consolidation of the Danish People's Party
Th e 1995 annual meeting of the Progress Party prompted the creation of the Danish People's Party. Together with three of the Progress Party's parliamentarians, about 1/3 of the party members and part of party bureaucracy, Kjaersgaard chose to leave the Progress Party and create a new party. Th e Danish People's Party was formally established in 1996. As shown in fi gure 1, the Danish People's Party not only picked up from the Progress Party but went on to achieve a higher level of electoral support.
Kjaersgaard was not only the leader of the Danish People's Party but was especially during the fi rst couple of years simply the party. Th e party had no advertisements without a picture of her, and she kept the rest of the party on a very short leash with the support of a few trusted fellow politicians and party bureaucrats. Th ere is no doubt that Kjaersgaard was the party leader and decisive for the immediate success of the Danish People's Party. However, the success of the Danish People's Party is not solely one woman's work. Part of the success pertains to the rest of the small leadership group, which have been instrumental in institutionalizing Danish People's Party. Th is group has been expanded over the years but the core has been stable for the party's almost 25 years of existence. Th ey have taken on roles and tasks of major importance for the institutionalization and success of Danish People's Party. Kjaersgaard was successful with the Danish People's Party not only because she was a charismatic leader with a political program addressing topical issues high on the electorate's agenda but also because she had collaborators able to take on necessary and important tasks along the way. While there is no doubt that she was decisive, it is also clear that she has not been the sole decision-maker. Besides Kristian Th ulesen Dahl (see below), who was one of the four MPs who left the Progress Party, the group consists of three organizational people, two of whom became politicians.
Søren Espersen was a candidate for the Progress Party 1992-1995 but left with Kjaersgaard. In the Danish People's Party, he was in charge of press and communication 1997-2005, and was from the outset a central strategy oriented member of the leadership. In 2012, he became vice-chair when Kristian Th ulesen Dahl was elected chair; a choice that was not disputed.
Peter Skaarup had been centrally placed in the Progress Party organization. In particular, in the fi rst phase of party creation, he played an important role in ensuring that the 'village idiots' and 'fortune seekers' of the Progress Party did not enroll in the Danish People's Party. Peter Skaarup screened all new members in the establishment phase of the Danish People's Party since "he knew all the members of the Progress Party" (Kjaersgaard 2002; author's translation) .
Poul Lindholm Nielsen also has a history in the Progress Party where he was organizational chair in 1994. In the Danish People's Party he was, from the start, a central fi gure. In 1996-2004 he was vice-chair in the party organization, and has been party secretary since 2004. As such, he has not only been part of the party leadership. He has also had a central role in maintaining party discipline and unity. Poul Lindholm Nielsen is known for being the one (together with one of the organizational consultants from the party) who travels the country when there are local disputes or when rebels need to be reminded of the party line and party discipline. Th ese earfuls and expulsions have apparently given him the nickname 'Poul Blood' within the party (Sahl 2015) ; however, he fi nds this to be a necessary and natural task to take on to ensure party success (Nielsen 2018) .
Organizational mainstreaming and centralization in the Danish People's Party
On the face of it, the Danish People's Party looks a lot like the established parties in the Danish party system with branches, the annual meeting as the highest authority also electing the party chair etc. (Danish People's Party 2019a), i.e. basic mass party structures with traits from the catch-all and cartel party models also (Bille 1997) . However, the Danish People's Party stands out, having a higher degree of centralization.
Th e fractionalization and continued confl icts within the Progress Party have had an impact on how Kjaersgaard and colleagues decided to organize the Danish People's Party (Kjaersgaard 2002; Th omsen 2002) . Th ey consolidated their power by establishing a party organization with deliberate party rules and structures. Th e keywords are centralization and tight party discipline. Th e reason for the tight leadership control and centralization of all decisions is to be found in the prattle and squabbles of the Progress Party (Kjaersgaard 2002) . Th e Danish People's Party established a powerful leadership (and screening of new members) in order to ensure both that the 'village idiots' of the Progress Party did not enroll in the Danish People's Party but also so that the Danish People's Party could pursue infl uence within parliament. Kjaersgaard and her collaborators were very well aware of the need for tight party discipline if their mandates were to count in the parliamentary business (Pedersen 2006; Pedersen & Ringsmose 2005) .
Th e Danish People's Party also stands out formally from the other parties since their statutes are shorter and slightly more limited in the rights and duties granted to rankand-fi le party members. When asking Kjaersgaard why she established a party member organization if members are not to have a say, she argued that there is a tradition for party membership in Denmark that is, "parties are supposed to have members", but that she got her mandate from the electorate, and hence, was not to be limited by party members (Kjaersgaard 2002; author's translation) . Th e leader of the party secretariat in a similar way said, that "the party's voters are above the members so that members cannot enroll and think that they thereby may change the policies of the party (Th omsen 2002; author's translation). Members are left with no say on party policies. Th e time left for member proposals and political discussions at the annual meetings indicate that intra-party democracy is not a thing in the Danish People's Party. Th e annual meeting is a celebration, not an arena for debate.
Compared to the other Danish parties, the lack of intra-party democracy is not a problem for Danish People's Party rank-and-fi le members. Intra-party democracy is not an incentive for enrollment, and they are quite satisfi ed with the infl uence that they (do not) have (Kosiara-Pedersen 2014; Kosiara-Pedersen 2017). Th ey see themselves mainly as the cheerleaders of the party leadership.
One of the challenges Glistrup faced, when not wanting a traditional party organization, was a lack of funding. However, the context of the Danish People's Party is markedly diff erent than that of the Progress Party due to the public party funding available since 1987 and drastically increased in 1995. Th e Danish People's Party relies mainly on public funding (party accounts as published by parliament at www.ft .dk); hence, is not dependent on party members: "We live off the public fi nancial support. Whether we have 0 or 10,000 members doesn't have any fi nancial impact" (Th omsen 2002).
Th e Danish People's Party stands out compared to other Danish parties in regard to exclusion of party members. Th e national committee may expel members, and unlike with other parties, this decision cannot be reviewed by the formally highest authority in the membership party, namely the annual meeting (Danish People's Party 2019a; Kosiara-Pedersen 2015a). Th e Danish People's Party has had to exclude party members. In the fi rst election period also MPs, and over time both rank-and-fi le members and local elected politicians, have left the party either voluntarily aft er the encouragement from the party or by exclusion. Party staff play a central role in ensuring party discipline across the country (Nielsen 2018) . Hence, while the (smaller) degree of centralization in the Progress Party did not suppress the fractions, the effi ciency of the party staff and leadership has been much more successful with this in the Danish People's Party, where any fractional tendencies have been suppressed and 'solved'.
Formally, Danish People's Party statutes state that the national committee or 25 delegates may propose a party chair, and that the party chair is elected at the annual meeting (Danish People's Party 2019a). Indeed Kjaersgaard was re-elected with a standing ovation at every single annual meeting during her reign. Nobody questioned her leadership. And nobody questioned that she selected Kristian Th ulesen Dahl fi rst as her deputy, and then her successor. It was important to Kjaersgaard to build a party with enough party discipline to gain parliamentary infl uence. It was a deliberate strategy, and a strategy that diff ered from that of Glistrup and his adherents. Kjaersgaard needed "silence in the backseat", so that the other parties could rely on her delivering the mandates of the Danish People's Party in political negotiations (Kjaersgaard 2002) . During the ten years of providing a parliamentary majority for the right of center government, the Danish People's Party gained marked concessions in return for their support of the government's policies on all other issues. Th e concessions granted to the Danish People's Party was mainly in regard to stricter immigration and integration policies, harsher sentences for crime, more care for the elderly, and projects promoting Danish history and culture. In return, the Danish People's Party supported the government's economic policies that lay further to the right than their party program. Hence, for those who were not studying the party program, the Danish People's Party seemed right-wing on both the value dimension (immigration and law and order) and the redistributive dimension.
Well-behaved 'backseat' to ensure parliamentary infl uence
In the spring of 2011 tighter border control was introduced in exchange for supporting changes to the early retirement scheme; a deal that may at least partly explain the electoral loss at the 2011 election together with the lesser focus on immigration and integration policies in the campaign (Kosiara-Pedersen 2012) . Th e balance between the left and right sides of parliament tipped in 2011, and the Liberal-Conservative government supported by the Danish People's Party was replaced by a center-left Social Democratic led coalition. Th e 2011 national election was a setback for the Danish People's Party where they lost the three seats gained in 2005 and 2007. Th is was the fi rst electoral losses since their inception in 1995.
In sum, contrary to Glistrup's desire of his personal party unlike the 'old parties', Kjaersgaard chose the well-trodden path of established parties when creating the party organization. However, she added more than a sprinkle of formalized centralization to avoid the prattle and squabbles of the Progress Party. Politically, the Danish People's Party placed itself on the radical right on the value dimension, with an emphasis on anti-immigration and strong law and order policies, and they supported the right of center government's economic policies. Strategically, Kjaersgaard and her troops were able to pursue the strategy of seeking parliamentary infl uence that caused a great deal of antagonism during her time in the Progress Party. . He enrolled in the Progress Party youth organization at a young age and chaired it 1991-1994. From when he was 20 years old, he was a candidate at general elections. He was part of the Progress Party national committee for a year prior to leaving the party. He was a temporary MP in 1993, and was elected in 1994. In 1995, he took his mandate to the Danish People's Party, where he also obtained a seat in the national committee. He has held offi ces in municipal councils in 1997-2010. Aft er the 1998 general election, he became the chairman of the parliamentary group, and in 2001-2011 served as chairman (and from 2011 as deputy chairman) on the fi nancial committee in parliament. Hence, when taking on the leadership of the Danish People's Party, he had substantial political organizational and parliamentary experience to build on.
Successful transition of power and division of labour
In particular, two aspects of his personal background are relevant for the way in which he fi lls the party leader role, namely his ties to southern Jutland and his business degree. His upbringing and residence in southern Jutland, a rural part of Denmark on the border of Germany, has granted him a special status in this area (Nedergaard 2015) with substantial electoral support as the result, which became very apparent in the 2015 election results (Hansen & Stubager 2017) . Secondly, his business degree and his interest and understanding of the area of fi nancial policy has granted him a high level of respect among both political supporters and opponents. Th ese competences vary greatly from those of Kjaersgaard. Th ere are no indications of changes in the party organization, neither formally in the statutes or in how the party organization works in practice. Th ulesen Dahl has, as was Kjaersgaard, been applauded at the annual meeting's leadership elections since 2012, and the intra-party democracy and upholding of party discipline did not seem to change aft er he took over. Nothing changed in the party statutes (Danish People's Party 2019a), and the stability of the party organization and its crew, also signals no change.
Th e change in leadership was not meant to result in policy changes. As argued by Kristian Th ulesen Dahl: "Does a new chairman mean a new line of policies? Some may think so. But this is not how I think. On the contrary, we must cherish the key issues that have characterized the Danish People's Party since our foundation in 1995.
[…] You know where we stand -and it will be like that in the future as well" (Th ulesen Dahl 2012; author's translation). Th e ship should stay on the successful course. Hence, the change in party chair was not a result of fractional challenges. On the contrary, the transition of party leadership to Th ulesen Dahl confi rmed the stability of the dominant coalition. And as argued by Harmel and Janda (1994) , less change is expected in that case.
One way in which the Danish People's Party maintained its political profi le was to appoint Kjaersgaard as spokesperson on 'value politics', which would include immigration and integration, as well as law and order, which are core areas of the party program (Danish People's Party 2019b, 2019c). Th is implied keeping Kjaersgaard in the front line on the issues on which the party is branded. Th is was particularly relevant since Kristian Th ulesen Dahl did not have a strong image on these 'value' issues but had a strong image on the economic dimension, as argued above.
Th is division of labour seems to have smoothed the transition from a charismatic party owner with emphasis on immigration, integration, as well as law and order, to an 'accountant' type with emphasis on the national budget and economic issues. Th is division of labour and smooth transition of public image ended at the national election in 2015, aft er which Kjaersgaard was elected to be the honorable chair of parliament. However, a return was seen when the majority shift ed in 2019 and Kjaersgaard had to leave the chair of parliament. She returned to the parliamentary committees of 'foreigners and integration' and 'cultural aff airs', again emphasizing the 'value' dimension.
Th e electoral results under the reign of Th ulesen Dahl were initially quite marked. Th e general popularity of Th ulesen Dahl can be seen from opinion polls immediately following his election. A month aft er he took over, he was assessed as positively as the most popular party leaders of other Danish parties (Albaek 2013a) . Similarly, opinion polls show how the electoral support of the Danish People's Party rose in the aft ermath of him taking over the leadership (Albaek 2013b) .
Th e increasing support for the Danish People's Party also showed at the elections. Th e Danish People's Party increased their representation in the 98 municipal councils in 2013 to a little over 10%. Th e election to the European Parliament in 2014 was also successful with an increase from 15.3% in 2009 to 26.6% and four out of the 13 Danish MEP seats in 2014. However, Kristian Th ulesen Dahl did not seem to play a major role in this. Th e fi gurehead of the Danish People's Party list and campaign, Morten Messerschmidt, was very popular and pulled the second highest personal vote ever (second only to former Prime Minister Poul Nyrup Rasmussen in 2004) with his 284,258 votes. Th e result implied that the Danish People's Party became the largest Danish party in the European Parliament ahead of the two traditional biggest and governing parties, the Social Democrats (3) and Liberals (2).
Old and new strategies
Th e electoral success of the Danish People's Party culminated, for now, at the 2015 general election (see fi gure 1), where the Danish People's Party increased the vote share with 8.8% to 21.1%. Th is result left the Danish People's Party as the second largest party in parliament, aft er the Social Democrats, and the largest party in the center-right bloc of parties. Whereas the Danish People's Party previously attracted dissatisfi ed Social Democrats, at the 2015 election the Danish People's Party gained votes from the Liberals in particular, among other things due to dissatisfaction with the Liberal party leader and prime minister (Hansen & Stubager 2017: 36; Kosiara-Pedersen 2015b) .
Th e position as the largest party right of center obviously results in government speculation. While some populist radical right parties have joined the governments in Austria, Italy, Norway and Netherlands, the Danish People's Party has, like the Dutch PVV, remained an offi cial support party (Lange 2017; Mudde 2017b: 529) . It is diffi cult to know what exactly went on behind the thick walls of negotiations and considerations within and across parties. However, publicly Th ulesen Dahl argued that the Danish People's Party would get more out of providing the parliamentary support for the government rather than stepping into the ministerial offi ces themselves. Hence, despite the Liberals' loss of a quarter of its voters and winning only 34 seats, the Liberal Party's candidate for Prime Minister, Lars Løkke Rasmussen, acquired the parliamentary support of the bare minimum of 90 MPs to form a single-party minority government. Th e minority government was challenged due to various demands and almost ultimatums from the three support-ing parties. Hence, 1½ years later, Løkke Rasmussen formed a minority coalition with the other two minor parliamentary support parties; Liberal Alliance and the Conservatives. Again, the Danish People's Party avoided the formal responsibility and remained outside government offi ce. With the same argument as previously: Th at they would get more out of staying outside the ministerial offi ces.
While there is no doubt that Th ulesen Dahl kept his initial promise of not changing party policy and stubbornly worked for less immigration and tighter integration rules, in 2017-2018 there seemed to be a shift in party strategy. Th ulesen Dahl and the party leader of the Social Democrats, Mette Frederiksen, engaged in discussions on agreements and future collaboration. At the annual meeting of the Danish People's Party in September 2018, Th ulesen Dahl announced, that if their plan A, a Liberal led government with the Danish People's Party but without Liberal Alliance, was impossible aft er the election, they would try every means to secure the infl uence of the Danish People's Party. "If this is the situation, Mette [fi rst name of the Social Democratic party chair, Mette Frederiksen], you have my telephone number", Kristian Th ulesen Dahl announced (Olsen 2018; author's translation) . Even though the party delegates applauded, not all voters seem to have a taste for this strategy. While not the only reason for the decline, it did seem to push voters towards the Liberals and Conservatives; voters which are not keen on a Social Democratic led government. Th is may still be the case even though the Danish People's Party in the fi rst half of 2019 was brought back, tighter, to the Liberals with several political agreements.
Th e trend in the electoral support of the Danish People's Party has been a decline since the 2015 election. At the municipal elections in 2017, the Danish People's Party's support declined from 10.12 percent to 8.75 percent of the vote. In addition, contrary to expectations, the party did not gain any mayor offi ces other than one on the small island of Laesø. However, this is a slight dip compared to the results of the two 2019 elections. Th e Danish EU referendums and elections to the European Parliament have been useful in the formation of the Danish People's Party due to their right wing, strong stance against European integration. Th ey have previously mobilized on their anti-EU stance. At the European Parliament election on 26 May 2019, the Danish People's Party is back at the 2009 level around 15 percent, which would imply a halving of the number of MEPs from four to two. Th e popular Morten Messerschmidt did not stand for election, and his replacement, Peter Kofod, does not have the same charisma and popularity. In addition, the investigation into fraud in regard to Messerschmidt's MELD/FELD (Movement for a Europe of Liberties and Democracy/Foundation for a Europe of Liberties and Democracy) signals that the Danish People's Party has become part of the EU establishment and may be no better than the established parties. Due to the overlapping EP and general election campaigns, the party leadership was less focused on the EP election.
Th e result of the general election on 5 June 2019 was devastating for the Danish People's Party, who lost more than half their representation in parliament and is now back at the 2001 level of 10 percent. A peek at the opinion polls may give some hints at the reasons for the electoral decline. As argued above, the electoral support of the Danish People's Party rose in the aft ermath of the selection of Th ulesen Dahl in August 2012. Th e peak reached in the summer of 2014, while in opposition, was 24 percent, but the Danish People's Party hovered around and just above 20 percent from then and until November 2016. At the time of the formation of the minority coalition of the Liberals, Liberal Alliance and the Conservatives, the Danish People's Party took at dip to around 17 percent (Danmarks Radio 2019). Hence, it seems as if some voters reacted to the strategy of staying outside ministerial offi ces. Th e Danish People's Party recovered slightly and stayed around 18 percent during 2017 and 2018. However, since December 2018, the Danish People's Party has been in decline in the polls (Danmarks Radio 2019) .
Th e possibility of working across the aisle has been spoken out loudly, and while it may follow along the lines of the party program, this is not what at least part of their electorate wants; in particular those voters acquired from right of center parties in 2015. Polls indicate that both the continued strategy of not taking government responsibility and the B-plan of collaborating with the Social Democrats have been taken badly by a substantial share of their 2015 voters; however, it remains to be seen (with details from the forthcoming electoral survey) what actually caused the massive electoral loss. Nevertheless, contrary to what could be expected on the basis of Harmel and Janda's integrated theory of party change and party goals (1994), the electoral loss, while a substantial external shock, does not seem to have resulted in any immediate party change in either organization or policy proposals.
In sum, under the leadership of Th ulesen Dahl, the Danish People's Party has not changed either its organization or its policy. While providing the parliamentary support for a right of center government, the Danish People's Party has remained outside the establishment by not taking ministerial offi ces, which also support a no change conclusion. However, in the parliamentary arena, Th ulesen Dahl has opened up for more collaboration with the Social Democrats. While the transition of leadership from Kjaersgaard to Th ulesen Dahl was smooth and followed by increased electoral support, the downturn since 2015 may indicate challenges inherent in this shift . But in order to argue that the party leader change and/or the character of the new party is the cause of the decline would require that Kjaersgaard would have pursued a diff erent strategy, or that voters would relate diff erently to her in the given context. Based on the stability of the leadership group, this is unlikely.
Conclusion
Th e diff erences in how the Progress Party and the Danish People's Party are organized is much larger than any organizational change aft er the party leader change from Kjaersgaard to Th ulesen Dahl. While Kjaersgaard was not able to implement marked organizational changes within the Progress Party, she did stand for a diff erent strategy and policy than Glistrup, focusing on parliamentary infl uence, and a right-wing position on the new politics dimension, but more pro welfare on the redistributive dimension. Th ere were no substantial changes in organization, strategy or policy when Th ulesen Dahl took over the party leadership of the Danish People's Party; however, the strategy did change prior to the 2019 election. In sum, the overall expectation that party change was larger when Kjaersgaard took over from Glistrup in the Progress Party, and in particular when establishing the new Danish People's Party, than when Th ulesen Dahl took over from Kjaersgaard, is mainly supported.
Th e Danish People's Party has come a long way since October 1999 where the then Prime Minister, Social Democrat, Poul Nyrup Rasmussen from the rostrum of parliament with disgust and pomposity declared that they would never become salonfähig. Th e Danish People's Party was the second largest at the 2015 election, and it has provided a parliamentary majority for the right of center governments of 2001-2011 and 2015-2019. Compared to the protest line of its predecessor, the Progress Party and its charismatic leader-founder Glistrup, the road has been even longer.
Th e three prominent party leaders of the Progress Party and the Danish People's Party have been central in the development of these parties. Th e parties would not have been created without Glistrup and Kjaersgaard, respectively. However, more importantly, their personality and political decisions were decisive in their successes and failures. Th e electoral support of the Progress Party waned due to Glistrup's personality and adherence to a stringent ideological profi le, in particular a harsh tone in the immigration and integration policy. Th e Progress Party did not have the organizational capability and personalities to carry on without a strong party leader.
Kjaersgaard and her collaborators had the timely gut feeling (based on their experiences with the Progress Party) when establishing a party characterized by central control and tight party discipline, stability to provide parliamentary support that could be trusted, and a political focus on immigration and integration. Kjaersgaard wanted to acquire political power and make an impact. She organized in order to accomplish this. Hence, the party change when Kjaersgaard and her followers were able to establish a completely new party in regard to rules and structures, the change from the Progress Party was marked. Formally the Danish People's Party did not "experiment with new organizational forms" (Harmel and Janda 1994: 282) to the extent as has been seen with other new parties. Formally, they resemble the mainstream Danish parties, however, with more centralization and a strong enforcement of a tight party discipline.
It is rare to see a successful change in party leadership from a charismatic party owner to a completely diff erent type of party leader. However, the Danish People's Party seems to have succeeded with this. Th ulesen Dahl did not change the party organization and strategy at fi rst, and there was stability in the leadership group. At the general election in 2015 the Danish People's Party increased their electoral support and hence, must have appealed to more voters.
Kristian Th ulesen Dahl survived the drastic election defeats of 2019. In other parties, such a loss would be regarded as (at least partly) the responsibility of the leadership and have implications; this may not be the case for a top-steered party like the Danish People's Party. Since he is not the party owner as in the case of Kjaersgaard, electoral loss could have shaken his powerbase. However, this does not seem to be the case in the immediate aft ermath of the election. However, it remains to be seen whether his collaborators in the leadership will part with him in the longer run.
